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S.E.2d 113 (1953). The complaint, however, referred to the party as
a union. Rule 4 (d) (9) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure does provide how process shall be issued against unincorporated associations, but should not be read to alter substantive law.
LUGAR

&

SILVERSTEIN, WEST VIRGINIA RULES

48 (1960).

Perhaps the best summation of what became the majority view
was by Judge Wright in a Louisiana district court opinion. "Even if
this court read the weathervane as indicating a judicial overruling of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act in these situations and thought that solution
desirable, it could not presume to ignore the plain mandate of applicable statutes in order to achieve a result in accord with its private
views of what the law ought to be." Baltimore Contractor's Inc. v.
Carpenters'Dist. Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. La. 1960). Thus,
it seems the only avenue of corrective process is Congress.
James Kilgore Edmundson, Jr.
Torts-A New Test for Proximate Cause?
P, while pushing a stalled automobile, was injured when struck
by a passing automobile owned and driven by D. In an action for
damages brought against only one of the joint tort-feasors, the trial
judge instructed the jury that if the conduct on the part of D "contributed proximately" to P's injuries, they might find in favor of P
against D, unless the jury further believed that P, at the time of the
accident was not using due care in his own behalf. The jury returned
a verdict for P. Held, affirmed. Although the use of "contributed
proximately" in an instruction standing alone may have been somewhat misleading, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed on its
account where the objection was removed by the giving of other instructions consistent with the law. Metro v. Smith, 124 S.E.2d 460
(W. Va. 1962).
For the plaintiff to recover in an action for personal injuries,
there must be some reasonable connection between the defendant's
negligence and the injury sustained. This has been dealt with almost
universally by the use of the term "proximate cause". However, at
this point the universality ends. The doctrine of proximate cause has
developed a chameleon-like quality as a result of which courts have
in case after case attempted to clarify its meaning. To illustrate the
confusion and uncertainty of the application of this doctrine of proximate cause, the courts have used the "but for" rule, the "nearest
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cause" test, the "cause and condition" test, the "natural and probable
consequence" test, and the "substantial factor" test. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 44 (2d ed. 1955).
This difficulty of clarification is enhanced where the injury or
damage is caused by concurrent negligence of two or more persons.
Generally the test in such a situation is whether the negligence of the
defendant contributed or concurred with that negligence of another or
others to directly cause the injury. Parkinson v. California Co., 255
F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1958); Alexander v. Philadelphia Ceiling &
Stevedoring Co., 99 F. Supp. 178 (E.D. Pa. 1951). Plaintiff must, of
course, prove that the defendant was responsible for one of the concurring causes, but the defendant cannot base his defense on grounds
that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone.
However, he may escape liability by showing the negligence of another
of the joint tort-feasors to be the sole proximate cause. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. v. Freeman, 193 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1952); Houser v.
Kurn, 100 F.2d 488 (10th Cir. 1938). In such cases of concurrent
negligence, each of the joint tortfeasors is jointly and severally liable
for the whole injury, unless the particular jurisdiction allows the
apportionment of damages based on the degree of negligence. Siebrand v. Gossnell, 234 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1956); Hower v. Roberts,
153 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1946).
In litigation where the act or ommission is on the part of a
single individual, the West Virginia court favors the "foreseeable,
natural, and probable consequence" test. Miller v. Bolyard, 142
W. Va. 580, 97 S.E.2d 58 (1957). In other words, before the plaintiff may recover, he must prove that some injury was foreseeable from
the defendant's negligence and the injury that occurred was the reasonable and probable consequence of that negligence.
On the other hand, when the action moves from the single
negligent actor to the plural, these narrow guide lines have been
found too restrictive. At least up until the principal case, West
Virginia appears to have followed the general rule that where
the negligent acts of two or more persons continue unbroken to the
injury, directly and immediately contributing to that injury, they constitute the sole proximate cause. Roush v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607,
80 S.E.2d 857 (1954). Furthermore, where negligent acts of two
or more have concurred and combined to produce this so called
"proximate cause" of the injury, each may be jointly and severally
liable and it is immaterial which of the two was guilty of the greater
negligence. Reilley v. Byard, 119 S.E.2d 650 (W. Va. 1961).
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In this manner the court has broadened the guide lines used for
determining liability of the single individual, until a joint tort-feasor
may be liable for his negligence even though the injury might have
occurred without his negligence or even though it alone might not
have caused the injury. Under the former alternative, the test seems to
be limited to whether or not the negligence of the defendant concurred
and contributed with the negligence of another or others in causing
the injury or damage to the plaintiff or his property. Nor does this
liability seem to be changed by the fact that the plaintiff proceeds
against only one of the joint tort feasors. As West Virginia has not
adopted the apportionment of damages concept, each defendant may
be jointly and severally liable for the whole damage or injury. Reilley
v. Byard, supra.
While the principal case appears to be the first in which the
West Virginia court has placed its stamp of approval on the use of
the term "contributed proximately" as a means to aid the jury in
making their determination, the court has in several previous cases
used similar terms. Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co., 129 W. Va. 267,
40 S.E.2d 324 (1946); Johnson v. Majestic Steam Laundry, 114
W. Va. 352, 171 S.E. 902 (1933).
In Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co., supra, the court stated that,
"if it appears that plaintiff was guilty of acts of negligence which
'proximately contributed' to the damage complained of, plaintiff is
barred from recovery." The court here is speaking of contributory
negligence, but it went on to say that the term "proximately contributed" had the same import as proximate cause. In another action
for personal injury, the trial judge instructed the jury that they must
find for the plaintiff if the negligence of the defendant contributed to
the accident, unless they further believed that the defendant did not
keep his automobile as far as reasonably possible to the right of the
road. The court, on appeal, ruled that if the word "defendant", in
that portion of the instruction which was intended to negative contributory negligence and which read "unless they further believed that
the defendant did not keep his automobile as far as reasonably possible to the right of the road", had been replaced by "plaintiff", the
instruction would have been corrected. Or in other words, absent
contributory negligence, the plaintiff could be allowed a verdict
against the defendant where the defendant's negligence contributed to
the accident. Johnson v. Majestic Steam Laundry, supra.
The dissent in the principal case criticized the majority decision
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on two major grounds. First, the action was brought against only
one of the joint tort-feasors. There being only one defendant, the
dissent felt it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause, pointing out that, in
all previous cases of concurrent negligence, the action has been against
several defendants. In other words, the doctrine of concurrent negligence is not applicable to situations where there is only one defendant.
If this be the case, liability of joint tort-feasors should be stated as joint
or singular rather than joint and several. When two or more persons
are guilty of negligence, and the negligence of each concurs and
proximately causes or contributed to the injury of another, it is a
case of concurrent negligence. Ransom v. Otey, 144 W. Va. 810,
111 S.E.2d 25 (1959). At this point there are joint tort-feasors, each
of which is jointly and severally liable. Reiley v. Byard, supra.
Because the plaintiff selects only one, it does not seem logical nor
equitable that he must accept a greater burden of proof than if he
had joined all the joint tort-feasors. Certainly the same defenses may
be asserted by the defendant and the same proof should be required
of the plaintiff.
Secondly, the dissent placed great emphasis on the use of "contributed proximately" as being totally inadequate and prejudicially
erroneous to sufficiently describe the necessary connection between
the defendant's act and the injury sustained by the plaintiff. It was
argued that "contributed proximately" was not the same as "proximate cause" and since "proximate cause" was nowhere mentioned in
the instruction, it was reversible error. As pointed out in the foregoing
discussion, confusion and hesitancy surround any attempt to define
proximate cause or lay down strict requisites to determine liability.
From the number of tests that have evolved, it is easy to see how differences of opinion may arise and how opinions may change. Unfortunately, tort actions are not susceptible to hard and fast rules.
General guide lines and the innate sense of justice on the part of the
jury must be relied on. The West Virginia court has attempted to
establish some guide posts which are adaptable to the infinate
variations of tort actions. It does not appear that they have strayed
far afield from these guide lines nor, for that matter, enlarged them
by allowing the instruction in the principal case. In the past the terms
of 'proximately contributed", "contributed to the accident", and "immediately contributed" have been used. The words "contributed
proximately" can hardly be considered any more confusing to the
layman.
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Whether we call it "proximate cause", "contributed proximately", or "substantial factor", it becomes largely a battle of words.
What is needed is a separation between the issue of cause and the
multitude of other issues. 60 YALE, L.J. 761 (1951). This might not
alter a single verdict, but it could not help but lighten the burden now
placed upon the jury to apply the law which is rightly the duty of the
court. Whatever the answer, if there is one, at least for the present it
does not appear that the West Virginia court has made any drastic
alteration in their definition of proximate cause.
Robert William Burk, Jr.

Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Lack of
Jurisdiction vs. Mistake of Law
P was granted an absolute divorce in the State of Florida. The
decree included a provision that in the event H, P's former husband,
should predecease P, the monthly alimony would become a charge
upon his estate during her lifetime. H died while a resident of West
Virginia. P brings this action against the heirs and administrator of H
for the alimony unpaid since his death. The trial court ruled that the
Florida court was without jurisdiction to award alimony against H
which would be valid and enforceable against his estate after his
death, and therefore, such judgment was not entitled to ful faith and
credit in the courts of this state. Held, affirmed. A court in this state
may inquire into the proper jurisdiction of the court of another state.
The lack of proper jurisdiction in the court of another state will render
the judgment or decree of such state void and incapable of enforcement in a court of this state. Such void judgment is a nullity and may
be attacked directly or collaterally in any court where that judgment
is sought to be enforced. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385 (W.
Va. 1962).
The principal case revolves on the question of whether the
Florida court actually had jurisdiction to grant the decree in question,
whether they may have exceeded their jurisdiction, or whether theirs
was a mistake of law in exercising proper jurisdiction. If the error
was merely a mistake of law, the issues are res judicata and the full
faith and credit clause would apply. If the error is lack of jurisdiction or the exceeding of jurisdiction in granting the decree in question,
the decree may be collaterally attacked as a void decree. The difference is often quite difficult to preceive. In fact, the difference
between the concept of jurisdiction alone is often confused with the
improper or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by a court.
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